Abstract-In this paper, we present our study of an Eigenvectorbased artificial noise-based jamming technique developed to provide increased wireless physical layer security in transmitreceive diversity systems and analyze the impact of channel estimation errors on system performance. Our simulation results showed that with knowledge of perfect channel state information, the technique provided secrecy capacity of approximately 7 bits/s/Hz for a normalized transmit power of 25 dB for a variety of transmit, receive, and eavesdropper configurations. We also describe a novel method to simulate generalized channel state information estimation errors. While other publications neglect the impact of these estimation errors, our simulations show that the secrecy capacity decreased rapidly as the channel estimation errors increased. For instance, at 25% error the secrecy capacity of the jamming technique was only slightly better than the nonjamming case. Our paper also outlines upcoming research efforts to further explore error sensitivity and channel state temporal stability through experimentation.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of more wireless capabilities in communication systems than ever, the issue of wireless security has become an increasing concern for communication systems designers [1] . The wireless security challenge is daunting because unlike traditional wired or fiber optic mediums that require physical access to the communications path for signal interception, the wireless signal is broadcast and available to anyone with a receiver having enough sensitivity. While different cryptographic techniques have been developed for upper layers of wireless network protocol stack to ensure confidential communications, these methods are subject to attack by an eavesdropper with a sufficient amount of computing resources [2] , [3] . If the eavesdropper cannot isolate the communications signal or is prevented from receiving the signal altogether, no amount of computing resources will help reconstruct the original confidential message.
In studying wireless physical layer security, secrecy capacity is the figure of merit determining how well the system achieves the goal of communicating with the intended receiver while providing an eavesdropper with no information about the signal. This concept traces its lineage to the work of Shannon, who formalized the idea of channel capacity as the maximum transmission rate across a noisy channel.
Wyner [4] established the wiretap scenario, where communication takes place between two nodes in the presence of an eavesdropper. Leung and Hellman [5] generalized this work and applied it to the wiretap problem where the channels are subject to additive white Gaussian noise. They showed that it was possible to maximize the reliable communication rate between transmitter and intended receiver, while at the same time preventing the eavesdropper from monitoring the transmission. In this scenario, perfectly secure communications can take place as long as the channel to the wiretap presents a degraded version of the received signal to the eavesdropper [5] . By comparing the channel capacity of the path between transmitter and receiver with that of the path between the transmitter and eavesdropper determines the secrecy capacity of the system.
Secrecy capacity serves as an important performance metric when analyzing wireless physical layer security implementations. A review of recent published works in this area shows that many researchers have studied different techniques to achieve higher levels of wireless physical layer security to create an information theoretic secure communications path that does not rely on current upper layer techniques. These upper layer encryption approaches usually generate computational processing, cryptographic key generation and key distribution overheads [1] . For the remainder of this paper, we will focus on the performance of the artificial noise-based jamming technique to provide increased wireless physical layer security and an evaluation of channel estimation error and the impact that error has on secrecy capacity. Section II provides background on recent artificial noise-based jamming techniques and limitations. Section III presents an Eigenvector-based artificial jamming technique to increase secrecy capacity. Section IV discusses simulation results for the jamming technique when the system is given perfect CSI between transmitter and receiver. Section V proposes a novel concept for including channel estimation error into the simulation. Section VI presents the simulation results that included channel estimation errors. Section VII concludes our paper and recommends areas for further research.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION Artificial noise-based jamming techniques rely on the characteristic differences among spatially separated communications paths to form the basis for wireless physical layer security. These jamming techniques use the differences in channel state information (CSI) between observers to create conditions where the intended receiver can remove the jamming signal, but an eavesdropper cannot.
A. Artificial noise-based jamming techniques
A security technique proposed by Negi and Goel [6] , leverages the concept of secrecy capacity by producing a jamming signal that adds noise to the message-containing signal in a way that is removable at the intended receiver, but not at an eavesdropper. This method requires that the system perfectly measure the main channel statistics (between transmitter and intended receiver), share that information with both transmitter and receiver, then create a jamming signal that is in the null space of the main channel. When the jamming signal is added to the message signal and transmitted across the channel, the jamming signal can be eliminated at the intended receiver using the known main channel CSI. At the same time, an eavesdropper who does not know the main channel response will suffer from increased noise due to the jamming interference.
With a higher channel capacity than the eavesdropper, the main channel enjoys a secrecy capacity advantage as described in [5] .
In a continuation of work done in artificial noise-based jamming, Zhou and McKay [7] showed that in a more generalized case of M transmitting antennas and single antenna receivers, there exists an exact, closed-form solution for optimal secrecy capacity. By comparing the optimal solution to that resulting from a simplistic equal power distribution among transmitting antennas, the impact to secrecy capacity is nearly identical. This result simplifies the power allocation aspect of designing an artificial noise-based jammer to improve secrecy capacity.
Another unique approach to noise-based jamming proposed by Dong and Han [8] , [9] showed that increased secrecy capacity could be obtained by using a transmitter to transmit the message signal in the presence of a jamming relay array. By careful assignment of the antenna weights and power to the jamming relay, a communications system designer can optimize to either maximize the achievable secrecy rate within the total power transmit constraint or minimize the total transmit power for a desired secrecy rate constraint. The results of simulation showed that this technique produced a positive secrecy capacity as the eavesdropper approached the signal transmitter until the transmitted signal overcame the jamming signal at the eavesdropper.
B. Limitations and assumptions
While the above techniques demonstrate effective theoretical methods to increase wireless physical layer security, significant practical implementation issues remain. A primary concern is the method for generating the jamming signal in the null space of the main channel. Additionally, the techniques make the assumption that CSI is available to the transmitter and receiver with perfect accuracy. This assumption of highly accurate CSI is not always valid. In fact, some communication systems operate effectively with simple channel estimator schemes despite "large channel estimation error." [10] While channel estimation errors do not necessarily prevent some communication systems from operating, the errors do have an impact on overall performance. Li and Poor Fig. 1 . Original system model for artificial noise-based jamming [13] showing which variables are affected by channel estimation error. 
Channel Estimation Error
Impacts [11] demonstrated that the bit error rate (BER) of a direct sequence code division multiple access system was linearly proportional to the variance of the channel estimation error when using a linear minimum mean square error channel estimation technique. Their results showed that when the variance of the channel estimation error increased from 0.05 to 0.15, the BER nearly doubled.
More recent research has shed some light on the impact of channel estimation error using a more advanced estimation technique. Xiong and Hu [12] examined the influence of channel estimation errors on BER performance of interleavedivision multiple access systems that utilized the expectation maximization algorithm. Their work showed that when the standard deviation δ of the channel estimate error was held to less than 0.1, the system performance approached that of the ideal case.
However, when δ exceeded 0.3, system performance was degraded significantly even for this advanced algorithm.
Since perfect CSI is not available to any realizable system, the intuitive result is that the secrecy capacity, just like BER, will be negatively impacted by deviating from the ideal CSI. None of the research on jamming techniques described above presented any insight into the effect that channel estimation errors have on secrecy capacity. To explore this dependency, we examine a practical approach to artificial noise-based jamming and look at the impact of CSI errors on the system's secrecy capacity.
III. EIGENVECTOR-BASED JAMMING SYSTEM MODEL Ma, et al., proposed a novel approach in [13] that uses an Eigenvector-based artificial jamming to provide increased secrecy capacity. The technique, depicted in Fig. 1 , applies to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radio systems without preconditions on the number of antennas at the receiver or eavesdropper and assumes that perfect CSI is available to both the transmitter and receiver.
In [13] , a symbol s is modulated by a complex transmit weighting vector t before being added to a complex noise jamming vector w. This signal is transmitted to a desired receiver through a MIMO system with channel statistics between the transmitter and desired receiver represented by matrix H. The method, like that in [6] , assumes that H is known to both the transmitter and receiver with perfect accuracy. During transmission through the channel H, the transmitted signal is subjected to additive, independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian noise with zero mean and unity variance, represented by the complex vector n. At the receiver, the received signal is then modulated by the Hermitian transpose of a complex receive weighting vector r to recover the received signal as shown in Equation 4 of [13] :
The key to increasing the secrecy capacity is designing the vectors t, w, and r to maximize the symbol signal [first term on right-hand side of (2)] and minimize the jamming signal at the desired receiver [second term on right-hand side of (2)]. To accomplish this effect, Maximum Ratio Transmission [14] and Maximum Ratio Combining schemes [15] are used to select the transmit and receive weighting vectors. In this case, t is selected as the eigenvector v that corresponds to the largest eigenvalue of matrix H H H and the receive weighting vector as ‖ ‖ . Finally, the jamming signal, w, is constructed by multiplying a matrix with columns that represent the remaining eigenvectors of H H H by a vector of random, i.i.d. Gaussian elements with zero-mean and unit variance, scaled by a power coefficient. By taking advantage of the orthogonality of eigenvectors, the receiver can eliminate the jamming term r H Hw since the receiver is assumed to have perfect knowledge of H and can correspondingly calculate r with perfect accuracy. However, an eavesdropper with no information on H must guess at a receiver weighting value, resulting in a non-zero jamming term that introduces additional noise into the eavesdropper received signal. This situation creates a positive secrecy capacity between the transmitter and receiver when compared to that between the transmitter and eavesdropper.
IV. BASELINE USING PERFECT CSI Fig. 2 shows the impact of noise-based jamming technique with perfect CSI on the overall security capacity of the system. With normalized transmit power levels of 25 dB (normalized to SNR=1), the system provides approximately 7 bits/s/Hz improvement in secrecy capacity of the non-jamming case. One important observation in [13] is that secrecy capacity in the jamming scenario is not affected by the number of eavesdropper antennas in the scenario. As an example, the response from the case where the transmitter, receiver, and eavesdropper each had 2 antennas (2x2x2) was nearly identical to that observed when the eavesdropper increased to 10 antennas (2x2x2). Thus, the eavesdropper cannot gain an advantage by simply adding more receiver antennas. With Jamming
Traditional Approaches between the actual "perfect" value and the measured or estimated value. In the case of artificial noise-based jamming, the system may require that both the transmitter and receiver make an estimate of the communications path between the antennas. This information is then used to calculate the receive and transmit weighting vectors. If these estimates do not agree, the result can cause error effects to propagate throughout the system, as indicated in Fig. 1 . The proposed error model for a single channel statistics estimation sample is shown in Fig. 3 . When this error is propagated throughout a system, such as the idealized artificial noise-based jamming system in [13] , the results will be altered from those achieved under ideal conditions. The remainder of this paper focuses on a method to account for errors in CSI estimation in the jamming system simulation and presents the results that those errors have on secrecy capacity. This performance information can be used to determine the channel estimation tolerances required for a desired secrecy capacity. To test the sensitivity of the eigenvector-based jamming technique to estimation error, we modified the simulation code developed in [13] to consider CSI estimation that included random errors. In the modified simulation, a matrix was created containing complex, random, i.i.d. Gaussian elements with zero mean and unit variance. This matrix formed the complex unit vectors for the estimation error matrix . Elements of were scaled by the product of an error factor and the magnitude of corresponding element in the actual channel matrix H to produce the entries in the error matrix,
Adding Herr to the actual main channel H results in the estimated channel state with random error .
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS USING CSI WITH ERRORS By varying the error factor from 0 (perfect channel state information) to 25% (significant channel state estimation errors), the impact of the mismatch between actual and estimated channel statistics can be evaluated. This interval also corresponds to a change in the standard deviation of the CSI error between 0 and 0.25. In the case of perfect channel statistics, the 8 transmitter, 8 receiver, and 8 eavesdropper (8x8x8) antenna configuration showed the best secrecy capacity performance. To analyze the impact of channel state estimation errors, the same "best performance" antenna configuration was used. Fig. 4 shows results of running the modified simulation with varying amounts of channel state estimation errors.
The plots clearly demonstrate the significance of errors on secrecy capacity. With only 1% estimation error, the highest transmit power condition (30 dB) is already reduced by over 4 bits/s/Hz in secrecy capacity. As the error increases to 25%, the results show that the jamming technique is only slightly better over the range of transmit powers than the channel capacity of the 8x8x8 configuration without any jamming. Channel estimation errors reduce secrecy capacity because the technique relies on the orthogonality between the received signal that includes jamming and the receiver weight matrix, which is calculated using channel statistics. In the ideal case, the intentional orthogonality between w and r eliminates the jamming term at the intended receiver. In reality, when w and r are not perfectly orthogonal due to CSI estimation error, some portion of the jamming term is observed at the receiver. This unwanted signal adds to the overall noise level at the receiver and decreases the signal-to-noise level of the main channel, lowering the secrecy capacity of the system. The eavesdropper, having no information about the main channel in any case, maintains the same channel capacity because it's "guess" at the receive vector weights is not affected by channel estimation errors made between the transmitter and receiver.
VII. CONCLUSION Artificial noise-based friendly jamming techniques have the potential to provide significant wireless physical layer security that does not rely on higher layer capabilities as long as practical implementation issues can be understood and overcome. Our simulations that included a generalized error term showed a significant impact to secrecy capacity as the Average CS for 8x8x8 configuration without jamming channel state estimate included up to 25% error. At this error level, the eigenvector-based technique provides little secrecy capacity benefit over the non-jamming case. These results align with those in [12] , showing a significant performance degradation for CSI error with standard deviation exceeding 0.3.
Before these jamming techniques can be considered viable, additional research is required to study the effect of real-world CSI estimation errors, balanced against the complexity of the estimation technique required to achieve those accuracies. In addition to the sensitivity of channel estimates to errors, another topic for investigation is the sensitivity to weighting vector implementation imperfections at the transmitter and receiver, which could both impact the secrecy capacity of the system. Finally, channel statistics vary over time and must be re-sampled at some interval to ensure accurate statistics are available for weighting calculations. A study of the sensitivity of the time delay between channel statistics samples and the impact on secrecy capacity can help establish bounds for minimum re-sample times for various environmental conditions, such as indoor office and outdoor configurations.
